



Forged in Code. **Driven by Challenge**

## DAST in Modern Pipelines: *A Perspective from Graph Theory and State Spaces*

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# Introduction



In practice, running a DAST (for example, OWASP ZAP) in a pipeline is usually interpreted as:

*“The application was scanned and no critical vulnerabilities were detected.”*

From a formal point of view, this statement is not justified. What actually happened was:

*“A non-characterized fraction of the system’s possible behavior was explored.”*

The difference between these two statements is structural, not semantic.

# Formal Modeling of a Modern Application



We define a directed graph:

$$G = (V, E)$$

Where:

- $V$ : the set of observable states of the system
- $E$ : the possible transitions between states (requests, events, callbacks)

An HTTP endpoint is not a node, but a state transition function.

# States, Not URLs



A state  $s \in V$  can be represented as:  $s = (u, r, t, f)$

Where:

- $u$ : authenticated user
- $r$ : role or permissions
- $t$ : token / session
- $f$ : internal system flags

Two identical requests to the same URL do not belong to the same node if any of these parameters differ.

# DAST as a Graph Exploration Problem



Formally, a DAST implements a function:  $scan : G \rightarrow G'$

Where:

- $G$ : the real graph of the system
- $G'$ : the explored subgraph

There is no guarantee that:

- $G'$  is connected
- $G'$  contains critical nodes
- $G' \approx G$  in structural terms

## Coverage Is Not Security



The true notion of coverage would be:  $\text{coverage} = \frac{|V'|}{|V|}$

But:

- $|V|$  is unknown
- $|V|$  grows exponentially
- $|V'|$  is small and biased

Therefore, coverage is not measurable in absolute terms.

## NP Nature of the Problem



Fully exploring the graph implies:

- Visiting all reachable nodes
- Under finite time constraints

This reduces to a problem of:

- Exhaustive state exploration
- With a high branching factor

In practice, it is **NP-hard due to combinatorial explosion**, even though it is not formally reducible to SAT.

# Information Maximization



Instead of “crawl everything,” prioritize nodes with:

- higher degree
- higher centrality
- higher transition fan-out

This is equivalent to:

- maximizing information gain per request

## Implications for CI/CD



What does “DAST passed” actually mean?

Formally, it only means: *“No vulnerabilities were found in the explored subgraph under these initial conditions.”*

A mature pipeline does not ask: “Did DAST pass?”

It asks instead:

- “Which region of the state space did we cover?”
- “Which assumptions did we make explicit?”

# Conclusion



DAST in modern systems is not a tool. It is a mathematical problem of partial exploration.

When it is understood this way:

- the illusion of total coverage disappears
- conscious decisions emerge
- security stops being ritual and becomes engineering